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THE LAW ScHooL.-With the opening of the fall term two
new members of the faculty began their work at the School,
Professor Thomas W. Swan, who succeeds Professor Rogers
as Dean, and Professor Walter Wheeler Cook, for several years
past professor of law in the University of Chicago.
Dean Swan, the son of' Thomas W. Swan, B.A. Yale 1869,
a lawyer of Norwich, Connecticut, received his B.A. from Yale
'College, with high honors, in i9oo. While an undergraduate he
had been made a member of Phi Beta Kappa. In 19o3 he was
awarded the degree of LL.B. cur laude by the Harvard Law
School. For two years Dean Swan w as an editor of the Har-
vard Law Review, during his last year in the school being
editor-in-chief.
For the next thirteen years he engaged successfully in the
practice of law in Chicago,-since 19o7 as a member of the firm
of Bentley, Burling & -Swan. During his residence in -Chicago
he also took an important part in various civic activities.
While Dean Swan has in the past devoted almost all his time
and energy to the active practice of the law, he has always been
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greatly interested in matters relating to legal education; and,
as an expression of his interest in this field of work, in i9o5 and
i9o8 he filled temporary vacancies in the teaching staff of the
University of Chicago Law School.
At Yale Dean Swan will, as Lines Professor of Testamentary
Law, give the course in Wills and Administration for the second
year men. He will also have the course in Torts, for members
of the entering class.
Professor Walter Wheeler Cook comes to Yale from the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School after a long and successful expe-
rience as a teacher of law in several universities. He holds his
three degrees from Columbia University, A.B. 1894, M.A. i899,
and LL.M. i9oi. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Shortly
after taking his A.B., he spent two years studying at the uni-
versities of Jena, Leipzig and Berlin.
After being, successively, professor of law in the Universities
of Nebraska, Missouri and Wisconsin, Professor Cook, in i9io,
accepted a call to the University of Chicago, where he made a
distinguished record as teacher and scholar during his six years
of service. He has taken an active part in the work of the
Association of American Law Schools; and at the last meeting
of this organization he was elected President for the year 1916-
1917. From time to time Professor Cook has contributed learned
and important articles to the various law reviews.
At Yale his subjects will be Pleading, Crimes and Trusts.
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF OF UNDUE
INFLUENCE IN WILL CASES
In Appeal of Kirby' the Supreme Court of Errors of Connect-
icut held, that, on an appeal from the probate of a will, the
burden of proof of the issue of undue influence shifts from the
contestant when there is evidence that a legatee occupied a rela-
tion of special confidence to the testator, irrespective of the ques-
tion whether the legatee had participated in the actual making
of the will.
This proposition contains two points of interest, namely, (I)
a beneficiary occupying a relation of special confidence to the
testator must remove suspicion from himself even though it
may not appear that he had anything to do with the execution
I(i916) 98 AtI. (Conn.) 349.
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of the will; and (2) upon the issue of undue influence the
burden of proof may shift, and does shift when there is evi-
dence of a confidential relation between testator and beneficiary.
On either point there is a conflict of authority, and on either
point the Connecticut decision has weighty support. Neverthe-
less it seems that on principle and the better authority the decision
is to be upheld on neither point.
There has been much confusion in the rules determining the
incidence of the burden of proof upon a proceeding for the
probate of a will. The ordinary rule seems to be that followed
in Connecticut, that the burden of proving due execution of the
will and testamentary capacity of the testator is upon the pro-
ponent of the will, while the burden of proving undue influence
vitiating the will is upon him who alleges it.2 The proponent
must prove due execution and capacity in order to bring the
will within the terms of the statute by which alone the power
of testamentary disposition is given. On the other hand the
allegation of undue influence is an allegation of fraud, which is
-never presumed but must be proven."
It has been generally recognized that certain relations of con-
fidence such as attorney and client, guardian and ward, and the
like, give to the stronger party peculiar opportunities for the
exercise of fraud and that transactions resulting in a pecuniary
profit to the fiduciary should be carefully scrutinized. Hence,
the rule is that a relation of special confidence between a bene-
2 Goodno v. Hotchkiss, 88 Conn. 655, 666; Comstock v. Hadlyme Eccl.
Soc., 8 Conn. 254; Crowninshield v. Crowninshield, 2 Gray (Mass.) 524;
cases infra notes 5 and 6. In Page, Wills, Sec. 382, it is said that by the
weight of authority the burden of proof upon the question of capacity
rests upon the contestant. This hardly seems justified by the cases, for
most of the decisions did not actually hold that the burden of proof was
upon contestant. But they did attach an artificial probative value to the
presumption of sanity, and the proponents of the will profited thereby.
Now that the true nature of the presumption of sanity is established, there
would seem to be less reason for the above statement. The discussion
in Gardner, Wills (2d. Ed.), Sec. 48, is clearer.
3 It has been said that the allegation of undue influence simply denies
proponent's assertion that the paper he is offering for probate is the
true will of the deceased, and hence the burden should be on proponent.
Gardner, Wills, Sec. 61; Page, Wills, Sec. 4o5; I Jarman, Wills (6th
Am. Ed.), 68, note by Professor Bigelow. But the rule stated seems to
work little hardship perhaps because the allegation of undue influence
seems more like a plea by way of confession and avoidance than a
traverse.
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ficiary, not a near relative,4 and the testator, may give rise to a
presumption of undue influence. While some courts hold, in
accord with Appeal of Kirby, that the presumption arises upon
the mere showing of the confidential relation,5 text writers seem
for the most part agreed in stating the "more modem and the
prevailing rule" to be that the presumption does not arise with-
out more direct evidence, such as that the beneficiary took part
in drawing the will or procuring its execution.8
The latter view seems the better. If the beneficiary has taken
part in the preparation of the will, it is not unreasonable to
require him to explain his conduct. Moreover, if the participa-
tion does in fact exist, it cannot well be concealed, but will appear
from the testimony of either the scrivener or the attesting wit-
nesses. But where such participation does not exist, the con-
nection is too remote to justify the inference of an improper
influence. By the stricter rule, then, suspicion may be cast unjustly
upon one who is, from the nature of the situation, unable to
clear himself.7 It is proper to charge the jury that undue influ-
ence is not often susceptible of direct and positive proof, but
may be inferred from circumstances.8 Hence, the very nature
of the accusation of undue influence indicates a secret form of
wrong known only to the wrongdoer and the deceased and
which, unlike a crime, need not be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury would naturally expect a denial of guilt from
the person accused of committing the wrong, and yet such denial
would ordinarily be his chief or only means of defense. I-row
can such a person, who is often one of the most natural objects
of the testator's bounty, hope to clear himself of a suspicion
which his lack of participation in the making of the will would
seem to prove was undeserved?
The court in Appeal of Kirby felt itself bound by former prec-
edents. There have been broad statements of the rule in some
4 No presumption arises where the beneficiary is a child, Lockwood v.
Lockwood, 8o Conn. 513, or other near relative. Gardner, Wills, pp.
16o-i64.
5 In re Bromley's Estate, 113 Mich. 53; Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. i9o;
Re Davis, 73 N. J. Eq. 617.
6 Gardner, Wills, Sec. 62; Underhill, Wills, Sec. 145; Chaplin, Wills,
p. 96; Borland, Wills (2d Ed.), Sec. 98. See inter alia, Bancroft v. Otis,
91 Ala. 279, 24 A. S. R. 9o4; Ginter v. Ginter, 79 Kan. 721, 22 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1O24; Parfitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 P. & D. 462.
7Parfitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 P. & D. 462.
8 Saunder" Appeal, 54 Conn. 1O8.
COMMENTS
of the Connecticut cases; but these have been general remarks
not necessary to the actual decisions. Other statements in the
cases seem to look the other way, and on the whole the Connect-
icut courts have been loath to apply the presumption.9 There
does not seem to have been such authority to the contrary as
to make the present decision imperative.
But after a1 this question rests upon rules of public policy
and deductions from the actual experience of mankind and hence
any court may feel that the stricter rule is better adapted to the
jurisdiction it controls. The other proposition that the existence
of this presumption causes the burden of proof to shift is more
serious.
It might at first seem that the court was referring merely to
the ditty of going forward with the evidence; but it is not pos-
sible so to construe the language of the opinion. Thus, it is said
that "it is apparent that in many cases it would make con-
siderable difference whether the burden shifted from the party
alleging the undue influence to the party who denies it and leaves
the latter to support the negative by a preponderance of the
evidence," and later it is said that when the presumption arises,
the legatee must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the legacy was not obtained through undue influence.10 Clearly
the court was using the term "burden of proof" in its primary
sense as meaning "risk of persuasion." The isk of persuasion
is thus held to be shifted by the existence of the presumption.
Moreover, the court was familiar with the correct use of the
9 In St. Leger's Appeal, 34 Conn. 434, 450, 451, it is said: "It is not that
the mere relation necessarily induces or exerts an undue influence (for
all legacies by clients to their attorneys are not presumptively induced
by undue influence) but because drawing the will presents an opportunity
and a temptation, which, together with the personal friendship and con-
fidence and influence of the relation, justify suspicion and the requirement
from the legatee of satisfactory evidence that the opportunity was not
embraced and the influence was not exerted." In Richmond's Appeal, sg
Conn. 226, it is suggested that the presumption might depend upon the
facts of the case and might not arise though participation in the making
of the will was shown. Underhill, Wills, Sec. 145, gives Connecticut as
in accord with the general rule that participation is necessary, citing Rich-
inond's Appeal, supra, Livingston's Appeal, 63 Conn. 68, and In re Hines,
37 AtI. (Conn.) 384. The Connecticut courts have said that the presump-
tion was not to be extended and have usually found some reason, such
that the beneficiary was the child and natural heir of the testator, for
not applying it. See Lockwood v. Lockwood, 8o Conn. 513.
10 98 Aft. 350.
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terms "burden of proof" and "presumption." At one time it
had been held that on the issue of testamentary capacity the pre-
sumption of sanity (which is deduced from the fact that the
majority of people are sane) might be given an artificial proba-
tive effect and might be considered as itself evidence along with
the actual testimony.1 This theory was at variance with actual
human experience, for when a particular person's sanity was
once questioned, the fact that people in general are sane was of
no moment. Hence, it has been repudiated and the court has
approved the correct theory elucidated by Professor Thaver that
a presumption has no probative value; that it operates only to
establish a prima facie case in the absence of evidence; and that
with the introduction of evidence it drops out of the case alto-
gether.12  The court has also decided that the "burden of
proof" as distinguished from the "weight of evidence" or
"burden of going forward with the evidence" never shifts, but
remains constant from beginning to end of the trial.'8 Hence,
one would naturally suppose that in Appeal of Kirby the terms
were used with due appreciation of their bearing.
And yet it would seem that the court, in appyling in the Kirby
case rules established before the decisions making clear the true
nature of presumptions, have not squared the theory of this
presumption of undue influence from confidential relationship
with the general theory of presumptions. Such seems also to
have been the situation in other states where language similar to
that used in the Kirby case is criticised by text writers. 14
The true rule would seem to be that a presumption of undue
influence differs in no manner from other presumptions, and
that there is no shifting of the burden of proof.15 The contes-
tant has the burden of proof in the first instance, for he must
show the existence of the confidential relationship. 6 Until the
11"Sturdevant's Appeal, 71 Conn. 392; Barber's Appeal, 63 Conn. 393.
12 Vincent v. Mutual Reserve Life Assoc., 77 Conn. 282, 290, 291, the court
saying that they were unwilling to commit themselves "to still other
extensions, which must in reason follow, of what we regard as an unsound
principle and one which might easily become fruitful of unjust con-
sequences ;" Thayer, Prelim. Treatise on Evidence, pp. 313, 539, 551.
1 Pease v. Coles. 53 Conn. 53, 71; Baxter v. Camp, 71 Conn. 245, 253.
14 Gardner, Wills (2d Ed.), Sec. 62, n. 54. Page, Wills, Sec. 456.
11 This is expressly decided in Compher v. Browning, 219 Ill. 429, lO9
A. S. R. 346.
16 In Turner's Appeal, 72 Conn. 305, 319, the court said, in reffising to
order a charge that the burden of proof was on proponents, that it was
incumbent upon the contestant to prove the asserted confidential relations.
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contestant has done at least that, the proponent need take no step
to meet the issue of undue influence. The burden being on con-
testant in the first instance, it should remain with him to the
end. And it must so remain with him unless some artificial value
is given to the presumption arising from the relationship. To
give such a value to the presumption is not only unjustifiable
from the standpoint of logic, but is unwarranted from the stand-
point of practical life. We may require such a relationship to
be explained, but it is an unreasonable deduction from experience
and a disregard of the motives which may prompt testamentary
benefactions to say that the relationship when explained should
lead to any artificial results.17 This the court, in the Kirby case,
apparently realizes, for it speaks of this presumption as a prima
facie presumption which may be rebutted. If this is true it is
difficult to see how the ultimate burden of proof can rest upon
the beneficiary who has by proper evidence rebutted the primta
facie presumption of undue influence.
Public policy may perhaps require, and experience may perhaps
justify, the strict rule that a beneficiary enjoying confidential
relations with the testator should explain his conduct even though
he may have had no connection with the making of the will.
But even if this rule, which seems unduly strict, be followed,
it is respectfully suggested that the requirement of such explana-
tion does not change the burden of proof. The burden of proof
remains upon the contestant throughout.
C. E. C.
AFFECTING QUALITY OF THE NATURAL PRODUCT WITHOUT ADUL-
TERATION IN THE SENSE OF THE FOOD AND DRUGS ACT
Under a statute providing that "no person shall sell .
any article of food . . . not of the nature, substance and
quality demanded," and regulations providing that "where a
11 The jury may, in considering the evidence, draw inferences ("pre-
sumptions of fact") from the relationship. The presumption ("presump-
tion of law") should drop out with the production of evidence just as
does the presumption of sanity. While the facts giving rise to the pre-
sumption of undue influence may justify inferences of fact, the facts
giving rise to the presumption of sanity would not ordinarily justify any
inferences, since the presumption of sanity rests on the basis that most
people are sane and in a particular case where sanity is questioned an
inference from the sanity of others would not be justified. But the effect
of the presumption should be the same in either case.
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sample of milk contains less than 3 per cent of milk fat it shall
be presumed . . until the contrary is proved, that the milk
is not genuine," a farmer is prosecuted for selling milk testing
below standard; the milk proves not to have been tampered with
since the milking, but the cows have intentionally been fed green,
washy, quantity-producing fodder.1 It was held, with Bray and
Scrutton, JJ. dissenting, that the conviction should be quashed,
as the milk is genuine. The dissent followed Smithies v.
Bridge,2 where a majority of the court held that the milk of a
cow not milked at the proper time, and for.that reason deficient
in fats, was not of the nature, substance and quality of milk;
quality, when unspecified, they define as "merchantable quality,"
and consider its presence a question of fact. The majority,
adopting Scott v. Jack,3 hold that an unadulterated thing is
genuine and not within the act; adulterated, as to milk, means
mixed with another substance, or minus any part of the original
constituents, so as in either case to affect injuriously the quality,
nature or substance.4
Our own courts do not extend adulteration so far. An article
shall be deemed adulterated where any substances are mixed with
it so as to injuriously affect it ;5 or, in Michigan, if it is an imita-
tion of or sold under the name of another article, or if it contains
any added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or
injurious to health.6 Whether "imitation" could be construed
to include, e. g., even milk or flour from which some of the
nourishing constituents had been abstracted, is a question. The
Federal courts, as well, would seem in the Coca Cola -Case to
accord with the restriction set by the English decision: an article
of food other than confectionery is not to be deemed adulterated
merely because it contains poisonous or deleterious ingredients,
unless such ingredients have been added, and are foreign to the
natural or normal composition of the article.7  If the natural
presence of actively harmful elements is not adulteration, the
mere natural absence of nourishing elements will scarcely be
held so.
'Hunt v. Richardson, ii5 L. T. (K- B. D.) ii4.
2 (19o2) 2K. B. r3.
3 (1912) 49 Sc. L. R. 989.
4 Act of 1899, § I, subsec. 7.
5 Snall & Co. v. Commonwealth, i2o S. V. (Ky.) 36r.6 Mich. Comp. Laws, § 5o12.
7 U. S. v. 4 Barrels and 2o Kegs of Coca Cola, 191 Fed. 431.
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Regulation of food sales seems generally regarded as aiming
at the protection of the public from imposition. Cheats as to
the substance sold are met by statutes on adulteration, branding,
and colorings-not always too successfully.9  Cheats as to grade
are properly fought by setting standards of quality. But there
regulation stops; Georgia will not permit a municipality to go
on and prohibit the sale of a "valuable and useful commodity"
for being below the standard set, as ice cream containing less
than the required percentage of butter fats.1" This same idea
of protection from imposition only, seems at the bottom of the
majority decision in the principal case; so, too, with the New
York provision that if the herd sample be as deficient as the
sample tested, there shall be no prosecution." But beyond warn-
ing the public of defective commodities, is it not within the
legitimate scope of food regulation to take active steps to keep
them out of the market? Wisconsin, at least, has taken such a
step in enacting that milk containing less than 3 per cent milk
fats is, flatly, adulterated;12 and the court, in interpretation of
this enactment, acts with a rigor beyond that even of the
Legislature.13
K. N. L.
8 Food and Drugs Act.
9 People v. Fried, 133 App. Div. (N. Y.) 889; State v. Hanson, 136
N. W. (Minn.) 412.
10 Rigbers v. City of Atlanta, 7 Ga. App. 411.
11 Consol. Laws Ch. 1, § 35.
12 St. 1898, § 46o7.
13 Splinter v. State, I4O Wis. 567.
